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ANTITRUST AND NONMARKET GOODS: THE SUPREME
COURT FUMBLES AGAIN-National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
One aspect of the Burger Court's decisions is that one can be undisturbed
by the results, but nevertheless concerned about the content of the opinions.
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents,2 the
Supreme Court held that the NCAA's regulations restricting television
broadcasts of college football games violated section one of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.3 The result stemmed primarily from the Court's conclusion
that the regulations did not promote their asserted purposes. However, the
crucial aspect of the opinion is that, contrary to what precedent would
suggest, the Court determined that the NCAA's purposes were legitimate
in the first place.
This Note addresses the question of why the NCAA Court reasoned the
way it did and examines the means by which it arrived at its result. The Note
first explores the peculiar nature of the NCAA and how the antitrust
treatment of it and similar organizations has developed. It then analyzes the
alternatives available to the NCAA Court in reaching its decision. Because
of the inadequacy of other alternatives, including the option adopted by the
Court, the Note concludes that the Court should have overruled precedent
that inappropriately restrained its decision.
I. BACKGROUND-ANTITRUST SCRUTINY AND
NONMARKET GOODS
The NCAA serves two distinct functions.4 First, it coordinates and
markets competition between athletic teams. In doing so, it is engaged in a
commercial activity.5 Second, the NCAA promotes amateurism and
1. Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. Rev. 1, 45 (1979).
2. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984) [hereinafter cited as NCAA].
3. Id. at 2954.
4. Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983).
5. During the 1983-84 academic year, the NCAA sponsored 41 championship events for men in 17
sports. Gross receipts for those events alone totaled nearly $34 million. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLEnc AssociATIoN, 1983-84 ANNUAL REPORTS 23. It also sanctioned 16 postseason football bowl
games that generated an additional $43 million. Id. at 148; see Hennessey v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1149 n. 14, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977); G. HANFORD, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NEED
FOR AND FEASIBILrrY OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLErICS 63-67 (1974); J. WEISTART
& C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.12, at 761 (1979); Austin, The Legality of Ticket Tie-Ins In
IntercollegiateAthletics, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 10-13 (1980); Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics:
An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 657 (1978).
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education. This is its most important function,6 its historic raison d'Otre.7
In promoting amateurism and education the NCAA operates noncommer-
cially, 8 providing goods unavailable in the competitive market. 9 By defini-
tion, this function is performed in the public interest.
Antitrust treatment of organizations providing nonmarket goods has
evolved significantly in recent years. Until 1975, Sherman Act litigation
focused on organizations having commercial objectives, rarely dealing
with those having other purposes. 10 An organization's general character
6. See CONSTITUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
art. II, § 2(a), reprinted in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 1981-1982 MANUAL7-8 ("A
basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports."); J. WEISTART & C.
LOWELL, supra note 5, § 5.12, at 760, 761; Note, supra note 5, at 656, 657.
7. Fears of growing commercialism, excessive physical injury, and cheating in intercollegiate
athletics led to the establishment of the NCAA, then called the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of
the United States, in 1905. Note, supra note 5, at 656. The Association's first constitution stated its
object to be " [t]he regulation and supervision of college athletics throughout the United States, in order
that athletic activities. . . may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the dignity and high
purpose of education." INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, CONsTrru-
TION, art. II, reprinted in J. FALLA, NCAA: THE VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS 21 (1981); see Association
for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 558 F. Supp. 487, 495
(D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 577 (1984).
8. See Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
558 F. Supp. 487, 494-95 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 577 (1984); College Athletic Placement
Serv., Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 60,117 (D.N.J. 1974),
aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1050 (3rd Cir. 1974); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 5, § 5.12, at 760,
761.
9. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2948 (White, J., dissenting); Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94
HARv. L. REV. 802, 817-18 (1981); see Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136,
1153 (5th Cir. 1977). Economic analysis supports the characterization of education and amateurism as
nonmarket goods. See R. HAVEMAN & K. KNOPF, THE MARKET SYSTEM 209 (1966):
[T]here are some socially desirable goods and services that private firms do not find it profitable to
produce. These are goods and services which provide benefits that are not marketable to individual
purchasers. Sometimes these benefits are not marketable because the good or service must be
provided to all members of society if it is to be offered to any of them. . . . In other cases the
benefits to individuals and to society are so important in the value system of the society that
markets cannot be relied upon.
Education is cited as an example of the latter. Id. The NCAA is an extramarket means of providing these
otherwise unavailable "public goods." See generally R. KuNNE, MICROECONOMIC THEORY OF THE
MARKET MECHANISM: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 354-56 (1968); Weisbrod, Towarda Theory
of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three Sector-Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND Eco-
NOMIC THEORY (E. Phelps ed. 1975).
10. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959); Hennessey v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148 (5th Cir. 1977); Marjorie Webster Junior
College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 653-54
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
489 (1940); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975); Note,
supra note 5, at 663-64; Note, National Collegiate Athletic Association's Certification Requirement: A
Section 1 Violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 193, 199 (1974).
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determined the applicability of the Act, which prohibits only restraints "of
trade or commerce." 1 The possibility of a noncommercial organization
being engaged in this type of activity was considered too small to warrant
investigation. While courts might have subjected an activity with a clearly
commercial purpose to further examination, 12 they presumed that a non-
commercial organization had no such purpose.
This presumption shifted dramatically in 1975 when the Supreme Court
recognized that some noncommercial organizations were engaged in com-
mercial activities. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association, 13 the
Court held that a state bar association was subject to antitrust regulation.
Traditionally, courts had considered the practice of law, as a "learned
profession," to be outside the scope of the Sherman Act's "trade or
commerce" provisions. 14 The Goldfarb Court recognized, however, that
Congress intended the Sherman Act to be read broadly. 15 It then acknowl-
edged the business aspects of the practice of law. 16 Given those aspects, and
the corresponding chance that the bar association's market restraints could
have commercial ends, 17 the exclusion of the organization from antitrust
scrutiny could not be justified. Courts soon identified the business aspects
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides in relevant part that "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
12. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
13. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
14. The understanding that professionals provided goods for the "well-being of their clients and the
general public" that could not be provided in the competitive market was the basis of this notion. Bauer,
Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 30 NoTRE DAME LAw. 570, 570-72 (1975); see Note,
Antitrust Per Se Rule or Rule of Reason: The Right of Engineers to Formulate Bidding Policies as a
Learned Profession-National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 28 DE PAUL L. REv.
1141, 1146 n.38 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Antitrust Per Se Rule or Rule of Reason]; Note, The
Antitrust Liability of Professional Associations after Goldfarb: Reformulating the Learned Professions
Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 DUKE L. J. 1047, 1060 [hereinafter cited as Note, AntitrustAfter
Goldfarb]. See generally Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); 16E J. VoN
KALINOWSKI, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS ANTmTRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATON § 49(1984); Bierig,
Whatever Happened to Professional Self-Regulation?, 69 A.B.A.J. 616, 617 (1983); Note, Antitrust-
Professions-Per Se Rules Applied to Ethical Canon Against Competitive Bidding, National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), 62 MARQUmrE L. REV. 260, 261-62
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Per Se Rule Applied to Ethical Canon]; Note, The Professions and
Non-commercialPurposes:Applicability ofPerSe Rules Under the Shbrman Act, 11J. L. REFORM 387,
393 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Professions and Non-commercial Purposes]; Note, The Ap-
plicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J.
313 (1972).
15. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787.
16. Id. at 787-88.
17. Id. at 788.
723
Washington Law Review
of other previously exempt organizations, including the NCAA, 18 and
proceeded to apply the antitrust laws.
In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court shifted its inquiry regarding the ap-
plicability of the antitrust statutes from an organization's general character
to its particular activities. 19 Yet character continued to be important. It no
longer determined whether the antitrust laws applied, but was relevant in
determining if the laws had been violated. Market restraints imposed by
noncommercial organizations thus were to be "treated differently." 20 Re-
straints customarily subject to the more strict per se standards were to be
reviewed under the rule of reason. 2
1
The premise of the rule of reason is that the Sherman Act forbids only
unreasonable restraints of trade. 22 Reasonability is based on the purpose of
the restraint, the causal connection between the restraint and this purpose,
and the severity of the restraint relative to the ends served. 23 Implicit in the
call for different treatment of noncommercial organizations was the under-
standing that (1) restraints necessary to promote noncommercial ends were
reasonable, 24 and (2) noncommercial organizations, despite their commer-
cial activities, could often justify market restraints on these grounds. 25 In
18. See Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1149 (5th Cir. 1977).
19. Austin, supra note 5, at 10; Weistart, Antitrust Issues in the Regulation of College Sports, 5 J.
C. & U. L. 77, 81 (1978-79) ("Goldfarb makes clear that the antitrust laws will be applied where the
activity or relationship involved is of a business character."); Note, supra note 5, at 664.
20. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n. 17.
21. The Court left unclear what "different treatment" was to involve. J. vON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 14, at § 49.02[I][b][ii]; Lipner, Antitrust's Per Se Rule: Reports of Its Death are Greatly
Exaggerated, 60 DEN. L.J. 593, 596 (1983); see Note, Antitrust After Goldfarb, supra note 14, at
1050-51. However, subsequent cases and commentary have defined the phrase operationally as
allowing application of the rule of reason to traditionally per se restraints. See Association for
Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 558 F. Supp. 487, 494-95
(D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 577 (1984); Note, supra note 9, at 808-09; Note, supra note 5, at 665;
infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
General discussion of the two standards of scrutiny under the Sherman Act abounds. See, e.g., L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 63-72 (1977); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Phelan, The Continuing
Battle with the Performing Rights Societies: The Per Se Rule, The Rule of Reason Standard, and
Copyright Misuse, 15 TEx. TECH L. REV. 349,360-62 (1984); Note, The Per Se Rule ThatAteMaricopa
County: Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 24 B.C.L. Rav. 1087, 1092-105 (1983); Note,
Rule of Reason, Per Se Rule, and Professional Groups: National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 20 B.C.L. REV. 716, 724-28 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Antitrust Rules and
Professional Groups]; Note, The Per Se Rule and the Rule of Reason After In re Michigan Medical
Society, J. CoRoP. L. 595, 596-99 (Spring 1984); Note, Professions and Non-commercial Purposes,
supra note 14, at 389-92.
22. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
23. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 314(b), at 49 (1978).
24. See Note, Professions and Non-commercial Purposes, supra note 14, at 388-94.
25. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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applying the rule of reason, courts could examine restraints imposed by
organizations in a manner not afforded by complete exemption, while still
acknowledging the organizations' noncommercial ends. 26
The approach changed, again dramatically, in National Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers v. United States.27 This 1978 Supreme Court decision
severely limited the factors by which a market restraint could be proven
reasonable. The National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) in-
voked the rule of reason to justify its ban on competitive bidding among
members, asserting that such a market restraint was necessary to promote
safety.28 The Court held that this argument misunderstood the scope of its
inquiry under the rule of reason. Congress, through the antitrust laws, had
declared competition to be in the public interest.29 The judiciary could not
defer to what it might consider a higher value. Analysis under the rule of
reason accordingly was to focus solely on a restraint's impact on competi-
tion.30 Public interest justifications, absent congressional approval, were
not legitimate. 31 Even if safety was served by an insignificant restraint, the
Court foreclosed its consideration.
Professional Engineers limited the scope of the rule of reason. 32 It
follows that the circumstances where that rule is useful were similarly
limited. 33 A legitimate intent for a restraint is a logical prerequisite for use
of the rule of reason. 34 The Professional Engineers Court defined
26. The NCAA was afforded this "special" treatment in Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). The Fifth Circuit used rule of reason analysis despite evidence of a
group boycott, a clear per se violation. The court justified its approach by citing "the nature and
purposes of the NCAA and its member institutions," including its intent to preserve and encourage
intercollegiate amateur athletics. Id. at 1152; see also Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Co., 499 F. Supp. 537, 540-42 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
27. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See generally Redlich, supra note 1, at 52-56; Sullivan, The Economic
Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1,
16-18 (1982); Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions,
Expanding Coverage andRefining theRule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 265,322-26 (1979); Note,
Per Se Rule Applied to Ethical Canon, supra note 14; Note, Antitrust Per Se Rule or Rule of Reason,
supra note 14; Note, Antitrust Rules and Professional Groups, supra note 21.
28. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684-86, 692 (1978).
29. Id. at 692.
30. Id. at 690.
31. Id. at 692.
32. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
33. Prior to NCAA, this limitation apparently was not recognized. Despite Professional Engineers,
commentators continued to assume that the rule of reason could be applied for reasons other than a
restraint's competitive potential. They then charged that this led to the perverse situation in which the
same factors that allowed application of the rule of reason could not be considered in analysis under it.
E.g., Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments-1979, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 15 (1980); Note, supra
note 9, at 810. This position simply misses the full implications of Professional Engineers.
34. It is irrational to use the rule of reason because of an organization's special purposes if such
purposes cannot justify a restraint. For example, it makes no sense to use the rule of reason on restraints
intended to provide nonmarket goods if providing nonmarket goods is not considered a legitimate end to
725
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"legitimate intent" to include only the intent to maximize competition. 35
Use of the rule of reason in Professional Engineers thus made sense only if
the ban on competitive bidding was purported to maximize competition.
The NSPE asserted only a public interest justification. Hence, its market
restraint was ruled per se illegal. 36
Since promoting safety was not the primary purpose served by the
NSPE, it could remain a viable organization despite the Court's ruling. The
question remaining, presented to the Court in NCAA, 37 was how to treat
organizations providing primarily public interest goods and needing mar-
ket restraints to do so.
II. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION v. BOARD
OF REGENTS
In NCAA, the Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA's regulations restrict-
ing the television broadcast of college football games violated section one
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 38 Under its television "plan," the NCAA
sold the broadcast rights to a limited number of football games to two
networks as a single package. 39 Networks and individual universities were
begin with.
35. Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 688; see supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
36. The Court's extensive discussion of the rule of reason led some courts and commentators to
believe that it had employed that rule in invalidating the NSPE's restraint. See, e.g., Association for
Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 558 F. Supp. 487, 495
(D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 577 (1984); E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A
NUTSHELL 170 (1981); Redlich, supra note 1, at 36; Sullivan, supra note 27, at 17; Sullivan & Wiley,
supra note 27, at 323. This confuses the Court's discussion of whether the rule should be applied with
its actual application. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19
n.33 (1979); Clanton, Horizontal Agreements, The Rule of Reason, and the General Motors-Toyota
Joint Venture, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1239, 1248 (1984); Favretto, The Per Se Rule: Alive and Well and
Living in Catalano, 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 11, 16 (1981).
In essence, the Professional Engineers Court determined that since the only justification the NSPE
had to offer for its market restraints could not be considered under the rule of reason, the rule would not
be applied. It consequently affirmed the lower courts, 404 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1975), 555 F.2d 978
(D.C. Cir. 1977), holding the NSPE's prohibition on competitive bidding a per se violation. 435 U.S. at
681. See Favretto, supra, at 11-16; Lipner, supra note 21, at 593, 599; Little & Rush, Resolving the
Conflict Between Professional Ethics Opinions and Antitrust Laws, 15 GA. L. REV. 341, 353 (198 1);
Note. Per Se Rule Applied to Ethical Canon, supra note 14, at 267. The Court itself has affirmed this
interpretation. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (per curiam). See
generally Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by "Facial Examination" of Restraints: The Burger
Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 WASH. L. REV. 1, 16 n.92 (1984).
37. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
38. Id. at 2954.
39. The Court's discussion of the plan is extensive. 104 S. Ct. at 2954-57. See generally Warner
Amex Cable v. American Broadcasting Co., 499 F. Supp. 537, 540-44 (S.D. Ohio 1980); NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1982-1985 NCAA FOOTBALL TELEVISION PLAN (1982), reprinted
in Brief for the Petitioner Joint Appendix: Volume I at 31, NCAA, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984); B. RADER, IN
ITS OWN IMAGE: How TELEVISION HAS TRANSFORMED SPORTS 69--82 (1984); FALLA, supra note 7, at
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not allowed to negotiate their own contracts. 40 Although the networks were
free to choose the exact games to be broadcast, their choices had to be
consistent with the plan's limit on the number of times any single university
could be televised. Furthermore, the plan fixed the compensation each
university received for having its game televised.
According to the Court, the television plan constituted both horizontal
price-fixing and output limitation.4 Such trade restraints traditionally had
been treated as per se antitrust violations and struck down without further
investigation.4 2 The Court decided, however, that the traditional approach
in this case would be inappropriate.4 3 Its decision was not based on respect
for the NCAA's historic nonmarket purpose.44 Rather, the Court noted that
cooperation among universities was the essence of the NCAA's product-
amateur collegiate football. 45 Without some regulations, that product
could not be provided. As a result, the television plan potentially enabled a
product to be marketed that would otherwise be unavailable. 46 To deter-
mine whether the plan actually served such a procompetitive end,47 the
Court applied the rule of reason.48
Under the rule of reason, the Court's sole objective was to determine the
television plan's competitive impact.49 It concluded that the restraints
97-123; Hochberg & Horwitz, Broadcasting and CATV: The Beauty and the Bane of Major College
Football, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 112 (1973).
40. The plan allowed for a limited number of "exceptions" to this rule, but they served only to
prove, not deny, its anticompetitive impact. See Note, supra note 5, at 661 n.30.
41. 104 S. Ct. at 2959-60.
42. Id. at 2960.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2961, 2969.
46. Id. at 2961.
47. In its focus on the NCAA's potential to create market efficiencies, the Court furthered the
approach ushered in by Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-59 (1977), and
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-24 (1979), which
recognized that market restraints can have some anticompetitive effects yet remain, as a whole,
procompetitive. Courts had followed this approach to a limited degree prior to 1977, e.g. in cases
involving sports organizations, see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. However, Sylvania and
Broadcast Music provided for a much broader application. The NCAA Court cited both of these cases
with approval, 104 S. Ct. at 2961-62.
While discussion of these two cases, and what is generally known as the "Chicago School" of
antitrust analysis is beyond the scope of this Note, other commentary is plentiful. See, e.g., Bohling, A
Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis, and
Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REv. 461 (1979); Lois, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing
Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music, 66 VA. L. REv. 879
(1980); Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 CoLum.
L. Rnv. 1 (1978); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. Cmn. L. REV. 1 (1977); Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrustAnalysis, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 925 (1979).
48. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2962.
49. Id.
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imposed by the plan had several anticompetitive effects. 50 Relying on the
lower court's findings, it agreed that the television plan significantly
decreased the number of games broadcast, increased the price that the
networks paid for television rights, and created a structure unresponsive to
consumer demand. 51 The NCAA bore the heavy burden of justifying such
restraints.
The NCAA argued that its interest in maintaining a competitive balance
among amateur teams justified its broadcast regulations. 52 The Court
acknowledged that this was a legitimate and important concern. 53 A com-
petitive balance among amateur athletic teams enhanced consumer interest
in the NCAA's product and consequently was procompetitive. 54 Yet the
majority was not convinced that the television plan served this end. 55
Evidence showed that without the plan, "consumption" of collegiate
football would increase. 56 Hence, the NCAA could not contend that the
plan was necessary for it to provide or promote its product. Rather, the
Court held the plan to be an unreasonable market restraint.
Justices White and Rehnquist joined in dissent. 57 They argued that the
NCAA's regulations served primarily social and not economic ends,
providing a system of amateur athletics that could not be provided in the
competitive market.58 Because of the essential noneconomic nature of the
organization, any market restraint resulting from its regulations was rea-
sonable if it promoted this public good. The Court's rule of reason analysis,
they contended, was not limited by the Professional Engineers doctrine. 59
Since the television plan was no different than other regulations, 60 it did not
violate the Sherman Act, and should have been upheld. 61
50. Id. at 2963-64.
51. The NCAA argued that because it possessed no market power, its television plan could have no
anticompetitive effects. Id. at 2965. The Court rejected this contention on two grounds. It stated: (I) that
lack of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output, id. at 2965, and (2)
that regardless, the NCAA in fact possessed market power. Id. at 2966.
52. The NCAA also argued that the television plan was a cooperative "joint venture" that assisted
in the marketing of broadcast rights and was therefore procompetitive, and that the plan was necessary
to enable the NCAA to penetrate the market through an attractive package sale. Id. at 2967-68. The
Court rejected both arguments on causal grounds.
53. Id. at 2969.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2970-71.
57. Id. at 2971-79 (White, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2972.
59. Id. at 2978.
60. Id. at 2972.
61. The dissenters also argued that the television plan had no anticompetitive effects because the
NCAA did not possess any market power. Id. at 2976-77.
728
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III. ANALYSIS-THE NCAA COURT'S OPTIONS
Before the Court considered whether the television plan served the ends
claimed by the NCAA, it had to determine whether those ends, if met,
would justify market restraints. In making this determination, the Court
had four choices. It could have held: (1) that as a public interest, promoting
education and amateurism is not a legitimate goal under Professional
Engineers; (2) that public interest justifications offered by the NCAA,
because of the nature of the organization, are legitimate regardless of
Professional Engineers; (3) that since education and amateurism are mar-
ket products, promoting them is procompetitive and therefore legitimate
under Professional Engineers; or (4) that public interest goals, such as
those of the NCAA, are legitimate, thus overruling Professional Engi-
neers.
62
Public policy precluded the first option. The second option also was
precluded because the NCAA could not rationally be distinguished from
the NSPE such that Professional Engineers was not controlling. The third
option, which the Court adopted, served only to demonstrate the weakness
of Professional Engineers. Consequently, the fourth option was the only
valid alternative, and the approach the Court should have followed.
A. Option One-Apply Professional Engineers to Nonmarket Goods
In examining the NCAA's television plan, the Court could have applied
the Professional Engineers doctrine while considering the NCAA's out-
put-education and amateurism-as nonmarket goods. Although this was
the most obvious alternative, it was also the least desirable. It would have
stripped the NCAA of its essential purposes.
Under Professional Engineers, the only legitimate purpose for a market
restraint is that of promoting competition. 63 Nonmarket goods, however,
are not yielded by the competitive market.64 Hence, by definition, the
intent to promote nonmarket goods is not procompetitive. To the extent that
62. The NCAA Court might also have limited Professional Engineers to its facts by stating that the
opinion merely reflected its belief that safety was a pretext for the NSPE's unjustifiably broad market
restraint. This reasoning, however, is inconsistent with the sweeping language of the opinion, and its
interpretation in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186-87 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Redlich, supra note 1, at 54; Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 27, at 322-26.
63. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 9.
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the television plan's purpose was to promote education and amateurism, it
was not procompetitive. 65
Under this analysis, the Court would have struck down the television
plan, a restraint with no competitive potential, as per se illegal. It would
have had no reason to investigate any further. More significantly, by
identifying the NCAA's nonmarket goals as illegitimate, it would have
implicitly disallowed any NCAA restraint that served only to maintain the
educational and amateur aspects of college athletics. 66 The objectionable
nature of this approach, which would have in effect eliminated amateur
collegiate sport, is evident.
B. Option Two-Distinguish NCAA from Professional Engineers
1. As a Noncommercial Organization
Another possible approach would have distinguished NCAA from
Professional Engineers based on the general character of the organizations
involved. The premise of such an approach is that the Professional Engi-
neers doctrine applies only to commercial organizations. 67 Thus the
NCAA, pursuing primarily noneconomic ends, is exempt from the holding
and free to impose market restraints justified by its public interest goals. 68
This reasoning, however, finds little support in Professional Engineers and
does not accord with recent antitrust decisions.
65. To the extent that the NCAA intended the television plan to serve procompetitive purposes
independent of its relationship to education and amateurism, see 104 S. Ct. at 2967-69, the Court still
might have examined the plan under the rule of reason. This, however, would not have denied the
illegitimacy of the NCAA's educational and amateur goals.
66. As a result, the NCAA would be allowed to do nothing more than what was essential to its
commercial function-marketing athletic competition. This would have converted the organization
into merely another sports league. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
67. See NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting); Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach,
Intercollegiate Athletics and Television Contracts: Beyond Economic Justifications in Antitrust Analy-
sis ofAgreementsAmong Colleges, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 717, 727-30 (1984). This premise is based on
the questionable assumption that the NSPE is a commercial organization. See NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2978
(White, J., dissenting); Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, supra, at 727-28. Although the practice of
engineering obviously generates income, the exact nature of the NSPE is unclear. As a self-regulating
association of "learned professionals," the NSPE would seem to engage in a sufficient number of
nonmarket activities to be labeled, for antitrust purposes, "noncommercial."
68. Because of the questionable causal relationship between the television plan and the NCAA's
public interest goals, see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text, this approach may still have led the
Court to invalidate the plan. However, the NCAA's intent to promote amateurism and education,
unaffected by Professional Engineers, would have remained legitimate.
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In determining the applicability of the antitrust statutes, courts no longer
distinguish between "commercial" and "noncommercial" organiza-
tions;69 both engage in commercial activities.70 To distinguish between
those organizations for the purpose of using different rules of reason would
be inconsistent. It would be incompatible with the principle that antitrust
scrutiny is to focus on an organization's individual activities and not its
general character. 71 It cannot be assumed that the Court in Professional
Engineers allows for this result.
The Court's decisions prior to Professional Engineers also fail to provide
for this inconsistency. In Goldfarb, the Court refused to exempt noncom-
mercial organizations from antitrust regulations. 72 Yet once the regulations
were applied, such organizations were to be "treated differently. ",73 On this
basis, one could argue that there are two rule of reason standards-one for
commercial organizations bound by the economic justifications of
Professional Engineers, and one for noncommercial organizations not
limited by that decision. 74 This argument fails on two grounds.
First, the argument misinterprets Goldfarb. That case did not distinguish
between organizations based on their intrinsic character. 75 It simply recog-
nized that despite their commercial activities, noncommercial organiza-
tions continued to engage in a far greater number of noncommercial
activities than did commercial organizations. "Different treatment" was
merely to take account of this distinction. 76 Hence, courts applied the rule
of reason to noncommercial organizations because of the significant poten-
tial that their market restraints could be justified by their noncommercial
activities. 77 Such potential did not exist with commercial organizations. 78
"Different treatment" of noncommercial organizations-in the form of
application of the rule of reason to traditionally per se violations-was
grounded in a rationale consistent with antitrust law's focus on individual
activities.
No comparable rationale, however, supports use of a different rule of
reason. Just as noncommercial organizations participate in commercial
69. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
70. Id.
71. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
72, Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 786-88.
73. Id. at 788 n.17.
74. See NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting); Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, supra note
67, at 728 n.77; Note, supra note 9, at 813.
75. See generally, supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. This does not deny that commercial organizations engage in noncommercial activities. See
infra note 79 and accompanying text. It simply recognizes that the number of such activities is too small
to warrant rule of reason analysis.
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activities, so commercial organizations participate in noncommercial
activities. 79 To limit the application of the Professional Engineers doctrine
to commercial organizations would create a distinction based on an irrele-
vant factor. The message of Professional Engineers is that activities other-
wise in the public interest are unlawful if they impose anticompetitive
market restraints.80 Neither that case, nor others in the antitrust field,
suggest that this depends on the organization performing these activities.
This argument also fails to recognize other, more significant, implica-
tions of Professional Engineers. Prior to that case, courts treated noncom-
mercial activities differently because their market restraints served the
public interest. 8 1 Professional Engineers, however, precluded public inter-
est considerations. 82 In doing so, it implicitly overruled Goldfarb on this
point. 83 It is irrational to argue that the special treatment granted noncom-
mercial organizations in Goldfarb limits application of Professional Engi-
neers when, in fact, Professional Engineers nullified the grounds on which
that special treatment was based.
2. As a Sports Organization
Alternatively, the Court might have distinguished the NCAA by ruling
that as a sports organization, it was not subject to the Professional Engi-
neers doctrine. 84 The basis of this approach is that preserving the integrity
of the sport and fair competition is a legitimate purpose for market re-
straints imposed by such organizations.8 5 Thus, regardless of Professional
Engineers, the NCAA is free to impose its restraints, subject only to the
rule of reason requirement that they be sufficiently related to these intended
ends. 86 This approach, however, fails to recognize the dual nature of the
NCAA 87 and the complexity of recent antitrust decisions. Although prior
79. See Note, supra note 5, at 655 n.l.
80. See Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 691-92.
81. See J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 14, at § 49.02[l][b][ii].
82. 435 U.S. at 1365.
83. See J. VON KALINOWSK1, supra note 14, at §§ 49.02[11[a], 49.02[l][b][ii]; Note, Antitrust Per
Se Rule or Rule of Reason, supra note 14, at 1152-53, 1159.
84. See Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 n. 17 (D. Ariz. 1983).
In Justice, the court held that sanctions imposed by the NCAA excluding a football team from post
season play and television appearances for two seasons did not violate antitrust laws. Applying the rule
of reason, the court stated that the sanctions were reasonably related to the NCAA's legitimate goals of
preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition. Therefore, despite Professional Engineers.
they were valid.
85. Id.
86. Because of the "sufficiently related" requirement, the NCAA Court might still have struck
down the television plan. See supra note 68. Yet, using this approach, it would have been able to ignore
Professional Engineers and the limits that case places on rule of reason analysis.
87. Supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
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cases support the conclusion that sports leagues are entitled to special
antitrust considerations, 88 that conclusion does not adequately address the
antitrust issues presented by the NCAA.
There is little doubt that organizations promoting athletic competition
may impose regulations essential to protect the existence and integrity of
their sport. To that end, game rules, 89 equipment standards, 90 and safety
regulations9' are valid despite their anticompetitive effects. Indeed, they
have the net procompetitive impact of providing a product otherwise
unavailable,92 and thus are permissible even under Professional Engineers.
What this approach does not acknowledge is that the NCAA's regula-
tions also promote amateurism and academic values. 93 Such regulations
are not essential to athletic competition, as the existence of professional
sports leagues demonstrates. They therefore warrant no special deference
on grounds that they are procompetitive. Yet, neither can they be defended
on public interest grounds. Under Professional Engineers, anticompetitive
regulations imposed by any organization, including sports leagues, violate
antitrust laws regardless of their otherwise desirable effects. 94 An approach
in NCAA that would have treated the ends allegedly served by the NCAA's
regulations as valid simply because the regulations were promulgated by a
sports organization was not a viable option.
C. Option Three-The NCAA Approach
The Supreme Court could not rationally distinguish NCAA from
Professional Engineers so as to disregard the latter case. Instead, required
to invoke the Professional Engineers doctrine, it adopted an approach that
distinguished the type of activity to which it was being applied. Whereas
88. The very nature of the product-competition-requires league members to cooperate. NCAA,
104 S. Ct. at 2962; R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX 278 (1978). As one author summarized, "In
short, fans will not come to the football stadium unless two teams are playing." Kempf, The Misapplica-
tion ofAntitrustLawv to Professional Sports Leagues, 32 DE PAUL L. REv. 625, 630 (1983); see Brenner
v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445,454 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982); Hatley
v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977); Justice v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 577 F Supp. 356, 380-82 (D. Ariz. 1983). See generally P. SLOANE, SPORT IN THE
MARKET? (1980).
89. See NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2961.
90. See Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir.
1981).
91. See Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298-1300 (9th Cir. 1979).
92. See A. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPoRTs § 5.11, at 757-58 (1979); Blecher &
Daniels, Professional Sports and the "Single Entity" Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4
WHrrTIER L. REv. 217, 232-38 (1982).
93. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
94. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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the Court treated safety in Professional Engineers as a public interest, 95 it
characterized amateurism and education in NCAA as market products. 96
The Court recognized the NCAA's intent to promote these products as
legitimate. Such an intent justified its use of the rule of reason. Following
this approach, it needed only to review the causal connection between the
television plan and the NCAA's "procompetitive" ends.
The NCAA Court's approach demonstrates the faults of the Professional
Engineers doctrine. By limiting inquiry under the rule of reason to a
restraint's competitive impact, the Court emasculated the rule of reason,
converting what had been two distinct types of antitrust scrutiny into two
different forms of the same test.97
Per se antitrust rules declare a practice illegal when the probability of
that practice being economically anticompetitive is so significant that
further examination is unjustified. 98 Following Professional Engineers,
courts apply the rule of reason only when the probability of that practice
being anticompetitive is not significant and further examination is justified
to verify its actual impact.99 In focusing on nothing other than a restraint's
competitive impact, the rule of reason analysis reflected in NCAA is little
more than an extended determination of whether that restraint is per se
illegal. The Court's opinion implicitly recognized this fact, yet dismissed it
as seemingly unimportant. 100 If past antitrust developments are any indica-
tion, it is possible that eventually only a single antitrust standard will
remain. 101 Regardless of its desirability, a decision with this potential effect
95. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
96. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2961. It is actually unclear whether the Court characterized education and
amateurism themselves as market products or as "aspects" of a market product. In either case the effect
is the same: the Court arbitrarily declared that promoting amateurism and education was "procom-
petitive." despite traditional treatment of the two items as nonmarket goods. See supra note 9.
97. See Harrison, Price Fixing, The Professions, and Ancillary Restraints: Coping With Maricopa
County, 1982 ILL. L. REV. 925, 931; Lipner, supra note 21, at 599-600; Little & Rush, supra note 36. at
353; Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 27, at 323. See generally Brunet, supra note 36, at 14-27.
98. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
99. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
100. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2962 n.26 ("Indeed, there is often no bright line separating per se from
Rule of Reason analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the
evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct."). The Professional Engineers opinion
pretended to keep the distinction between the two standards alive, 435 U.S. at 692 ("Itlhere are. thus,
two complementary categories of antitrust analysis"), but then held that analysis under each could not
differ ("[i]n either event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive
significance of the restraint .... " Id. (emphasis added)).
101. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), the Court reiterated the
well-worn principle that "[olnce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption
that the restraint is unreasonable." Id. at 344. Taking this to its logical conclusion, a focus under the rule
of reason solely on the competitive impact of market restraints will lead eventually to a categorization of
those restraints as either anticompetitive or procompetitive; per se illegal or per se legal. With sufficient
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deserves more discussion and explanation than that provided in NCAA.
Of greater significance is the proof offered by NCAA that the Supreme
Court's sacrifice of the rule of reason served no purpose. Those favoring a
limited rule of reason 0 2 argue that to allow judges to consider public
interest justifications for restraints of trade puts them in the position of
determining what, if anything, is to be valued more than competition. It is,
they contend, within the exclusive power of Congress to establish the
values national legislation is to promote. Furthermore, Congress' sole
purpose in passing the antitrust laws was to promote competition. For the
courts to meddle with this policy would represent judicial usurpation of
congressional power, placing national policy decisions at the whim of the
unpredictable and inconsistent judiciary. The Court's reasoning in NCAA,
however, reflects just such judicial decisionmaking.
Clearly, Professional Engineers did not strip the Court of all discretion
as to antitrust matters. It established that only market restraints with a
procompetitive effect are justifiable. To be permitted, a particular regula-
tion must provide or promote a market product. The Court, however, never
defined "procompetitive" nor set forth standards by which legitimate
market products could be identified. 103 This is the loophole through which
the NCAA Court stepped by simply choosing to consider the NCAA's
output a market product. The Court gave no explanation of how this
decision was reached, nor on what standards it was based. Amateurism and
education are nonmarket public goods, not market products, and had
previously been treated as such by the courts. 104 The NCAA Court changed
this characterization without comment. It applied the label that achieved
the desired result.
The way in which the Court exercised this discretion is the most signifi-
cant aspect of NCAA. As a producer of nonmarket goods, the NCAA would
have had no justification for its market restraints other than that they served
experience, courts will no longer have any use for the rule of reason in its current form. This assumes a
finite number of market arrangements for the courts to examine. Regardless, even without further
decay, the current "rule of reason" is that in name only.
102. See generally Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at
§ 66 (1977); Bork, supra note 21, at 829-47.
103. See K. Leffler, Towards a Reasonable Rule of Reason: Comments 4-6 (1984) (unpublished
manuscript, copy on file with the Washington Law Review). For a general discussion of the various
facets of "competition" that relate to antitrust, see Sullivan, On Nonprice Competition: An Economic
and Marketing Analysis, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 771 (1984).
104. See Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136,1151-53 (5th Cir. 1977);
College Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1 60,117 (D.N.J. 1974), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974); Marjorie Webster Junior College,
Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 653-55 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp.
295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975).
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the public interest. Under the limited rule of reason, such regulations, and
in effect the entire NCAA, would have been immediately condemned. By
characterizing education and amateurism as market products, the Court
sidestepped such a result. It could consider the NCAA's purposes "pro-
competitive" and needed only to determine whether the television plan
served such legitimate ends.
This approach is available to the courts in cases involving organizations
other than the NCAA. Indeed, it could apply when any organization
providing nonmarket goods through market restraints was subject to anti-
trust charges. If the Court believed that the organization provided some-
thing of value, it could simply label the good a market product. Anticom-
petitive market restraints serving the public interest would consequently be
saved from the immediate condemnation that they now receive under the
limited rule of reason. This labeling allows a court to examine market
restraints said to promote such "products," and uphold those that it
determines to truly meet these ends. In effect, it would permit organiza-
tions whose primary purpose was to provide public goods to remain
operative.
A limited rule of reason places the power to provide nonmarket goods in
the hands of Congress. 105 Yet, as NCAA demonstrates, the power to decide
what is a nonmarket good remains with the courts. If production of that
good requires market restraints, this decision will determine whether that
good may be produced. It may also determine the fate of the producing
organization. Courts can therefore be expected to characterize items they
consider important as market products. Inherent in this determination is the
same balancing of values, inconsistency, and lack of standards that a
limited rule of reason ostensibly eliminates. Courts will continue to make
the subjective judgments that previous antitrust law recognized as an
existing, if not favored, judicial function. Limiting the rule of reason only
masked this function while causing a fundamental change in antitrust
scrutiny.
D. Option Four-Recognize Public Interests as Legitimate
The approach taken by the NCAA Court perpetuates the demise of the
rule of reason initiated in Professional Engineers. It also circumvents the
barriers established in that case to the exercise of judicial discretion.
Unable to distinguish between NCAA and Professional Engineers, the
Court recharacterized education and amateurism to accommodate public
policy. In so doing, it exposed the inherent fallacies of the Professional
Engineers doctrine.
105. Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 27, at 324.
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The only remaining approach would have been to openly acknowledge
that public interests could justify some market restraints. Under this ap-
proach, the Court could have reached the identical result, yet avoided the
deception that characterizes its NCAA opinion. To the extent that this
approach was inconsistent with Professional Engineers, the Supreme
Court should have overruled that opinion. 1 06
Having identified education and amateurism as legitimate justifications
for market restraints, the Court could still have tested the television plan
under the rule of reason. By examining whether the particular restraint was
essential to the social values promoted by the NCAA, the Court would have
avoided validating a regulation that served only to restrain competition. In a
similar fashion, the use of public interest as a pretext for market restraints in
future litigation would have been prevented. This approach would have
restored vitality to the rule of reason, once again distinguishing it from the
per se rule. The Supreme Court also would have explicitly recognized the
"legislative" role played by the judiciary under the Sherman Act. If that
role is truly a significant and avoidable problem,10 7 Congress and the courts
should deal with it in a more direct and effective manner.
IV. CONCLUSION
In NCAA, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve much of the
confusion and controversy regarding antitrust law and the production of
nonmarket goods. Given the nature of the NCAA and the virtues it
promotes, and the checks against abuse intrinsic in rule of reason analysis,
the Court should have recognized public interests other than competition as
legitimate justification for market restraints. Although this would have
required overruling precedent, it was the only logical approach to the
antitrust issues presented in NCAA. By failing to reason in the appropriate
manner, the Court further muddled an already confusing area of law, and
offered little guidance for lower courts in future antitrust cases.
Jonathan E. Seib
106. This would not mean that the NSPE would automatically be free to impose a ban on
competitive bidding. Rather, courts would examine market restraints said to promote safety under the
rule of reason. Given the broad reach of a total ban on competitive bidding relative to the ends served, it
would still be unlikely that such a restraint would survive judicial scrutiny.
107. Commentators are far from unanimous in the belief that the courts' legislative role in antitrust
matters is to be discouraged. See Redlich, supra note 1, at 54-56; Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics,
andPolitics: Reflections on Some RecentRelationships, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1, 9-11(1980); Sullivan, supra
note 103, at 773; Note, supra note 9, at 813.
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